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Abstract
Under the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement Mexican producers were granted free access
to the U.S. sugar market while all other suppliers, including U.S. reners, were subject to supply
quotas. Following a surge in imports of Mexican sugar, the American Sugar Coalition initiated anti-
dumping and countervailing duty (ADCVD) proceedings against Mexico in early 2014. In December
2014, the ADCVD cases were halted as a result of two Suspension Agreements negotiated between
the U.S. and Mexico. This paper contributes to a very small number of empirical studies that
have estimated the impact of suspension agreements. We measure the impacts of ADCVD and the
Suspension Agreements on U.S. raw and rened prices, the raw-to-rened margin, and the quantity
and composition of sugar imports fromMexico. Results suggest U.S. raw sugar prices increased by 3¢
per lb. (14%) under ADCVD proceedings, approximately equivalent to an ad valorem tari between
40 and 50% while the Suspension Agreements increased U.S. raw sugar prices by an additional 2¢
(70% tari equivalent). Impacts on U.S. rened sugar prices increased by similar amounts under
ADCVD proceedings and the Suspension Agreements (4.5¢ per lb.). Ultimately, both ADCVD
proceedings and Suspension Agreements signicantly reduced sugar imports from Mexico. U.S.
sugar rener welfare hinges critically on the quantity and composition of sugar imports. As such,
rener revenue, following the ADCVD and Suspension Agreements, is estimated to have declined
by 16%, relative to a free-trade environment.
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U.S.-Mexico Sugar July 20, 2018
The sugar industry has been at the center of the most contentious trade issues
between Mexico and the United States since NAFTA was rst negotiated in the
early 1990s. The New York Times (June 4, 2017)
1 Introduction
Sugar from Mexico has entered the U.S. duty-and-quota-free since January 2008 under the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Mexico's free access to the U.S. sugar
market destabilized U.S. domestic sugar policy, and was a driving force behind the call to
renegotiate NAFTA (Malkin, 6 June 2017). Since 2008, Mexico has been the largest exporter
of sugar to the U.S., and beginning in late 2011, Mexican sugar exports to the U.S. nearly
doubled and remained high for the next three years.
In response to the import surge of Mexican sugar, the American Sugar coalition initi-
ated antidumping and countervailing duty (ADCVD) proceedings against Mexico in March
2014. In May 2014, the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) made a preliminary
determination that subject imports resulted in economic injury to U.S. sugar farmers and
reners, and in August 2014, the Department of Commerce (DOC) announced preliminary
duties ranging from 39.54% to 47.26% (USITC, 2014). Investigations were halted in De-
cember 2014 as a result of two Suspension Agreements signed by the U.S. and Mexican
governments, which stipulated price and quantity restrictions on Mexican sugar exports to
the U.S.
Since the seminal work on dumping by Viner (1923), legal and economic scholars have
sought to understand the incentives created under trade remedy law (TRL) and the as-
sociated eects on trade. U.S. ADCVD laws provide a formal mechanism, known as the
suspension process, through which domestic and foreign producers can resolve ADCVD dis-
putes by reaching an agreement that eliminates the risk of injury to domestic producers.1
1704(c) and 734(c) of the Tari Act of 1930 govern the imposition of Suspension Agreements in resolution
of ADCVD disputes. Similar mechanisms exist in other countries. However, their use in the European Union
has decreased substantially in recent years (Steinbach, 2014).
1
U.S.-Mexico Sugar July 20, 2018
If suspension negotiations are successful, the terms of suspensionwhich usually include
voluntary export restraints (VERs) or price restrictionstake the place of ADCVD taris
on subject imports.
ADCVD duties have disparate eects on prices and the composition of trade compared
to Suspension Agreements. This dierence can lead to a divergence of interests between
upstream and downstream producer groups with respect to the preferred regulatory envi-
ronment (Feinberg and Kaplan, 1993). A common ad valorem duty levied across all product
categories will reduce overall trade levels, with little cross-product trade diversion. In con-
trast, Suspension Agreements tend to divert trade toward nished products (Falvey, 1979).
The simple ling an ADCVD investigation can aect markets (Mahdavi and Bhagwati,
1994; Prusa, 2001; Staiger and Wolak, 1994), and ADCVD duties can result in substantial
trade reductions for named products and source countries (Prusa, 2001). These impacts may
be even larger for agricultural products (Carter and Gunning-Trant, 2006, 2010).
Though there is some discussion to the contrary (Messerlin, 1989), there is substantial
economic theory suggesting that Suspension Agreements can benet parties to the action,
relative to levied duties. Domestic and foreign litigants can collude to x prices and/or
the quantity of imports (Moore, 2005; Prusa, 1992). The parties also save legal fees from
continued litigation (Farr and DeFrancisco, 2006). From a political economy perspective,
even the government can benet if the electoral returns from industry prots are large
relative to the losses from higher consumer prices (Rosendor, 1996).
Empirical studies on the eects of Suspension Agreements are few. Staiger and Wolak
(1994) show thatlike ADCVD dutiesSuspension Agreements result in substantial trade
restrictions. Existing case studies focus almost exclusively on the Suspension Agreements
negotiated in resolution of the U.S.-Mexico Tomato Wars. Baylis and Perlo (2010) studied
the trade diversionary eects of the 1996 U.S.-Mexico Tomato Suspension Agreement. They
found that over three-fourths of the Mexican fresh tomatoes restricted from entering the U.S.
under the Agreement were ultimately imported via cross-country and cross-product trade
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diversion.
The 1996 U.S.-Mexico Tomato Suspension Agreement was re-negotiated in 2013. The new
Suspension Agreement substantially reduced the import of fresh tomatoes from Mexico to
the U.S. and eliminated much of the cross-country and cross-product diversion of tomatoes
and tomato products entering the U.S. (Ghazalian, 2015). U.S., Canadian, and Mexican
producers of several varieties of fresh tomatoes beneted from the revised terms of the
Agreement (Kosse and Devadoss, 2016).
The primary condition for successful suspension negotiations is that each domestic pro-
ducer be made at least as well o under the Suspension Agreement as it would have been by
proceeding with ADCVD investigations (Prusa, 1992). However, heterogeneous preferences
within the domestic industry make this condition dicult to achieve in the presence of trade
diversion. In the sugar market, sugar farmers prefer heavy restrictions on the import of
sugar and sugar-containing products, whereas domestic reners may prefer raw sugar inputs
to enter duty-and-quota-free.
In this paper, we use the U.S.-Mexico sugar dispute as a case study to explicitly compare
the benets of ADCVD duties versus the Suspension Agreements to dierent groups within
the domestic petitioners. We develop an empirical model to compare U.S. sugar prices
and returns to U.S. cane reners under Sugar from Mexico ADCVD investigations and the
U.S.-Mexico Sugar Suspension Agreements. We contrast our ndings with a counterfactual
scenario in which sugar imports from Mexico are unrestricted. Although there have been a
small number of papers on the eects of Suspension Agreements, this paper is the rst in
this line of research to assess the implications of multiple alternative empirical regimes on
distinct producer groups at dierent points along the domestic supply chain.
We nd that ADCVD proceedings and the Suspension Agreements increased U.S. prices
for raw and rened sugar, relative to free trade with Mexico. U.S. raw sugar prices increased
by 3¢ (14%) under ADCVD proceedings relative to a counterfactual free-trade scenario,
approximately equivalent to an ad valorem tari in the range of 4050%. The Suspension
3
U.S.-Mexico Sugar July 20, 2018
Agreements increased U.S. raw sugar prices by an additional 2¢, roughly equivalent to a
70% tari. Impacts on U.S. rened sugar prices were similar under ADCVD proceedings
and the Suspension Agreements (≈ 4.5¢ per lb.). ADCVD proceedings and Suspension
Agreements signicantly reduced sugar imports fromMexico. Consistent with (Falvey, 1979),
the Agreements also induced a major shift in the composition of trade away from raw sugar
and towards semi-rened (estandar) sugar. Some U.S. cane sugar reners were made worse
o from the Suspension Agreements, both relative to ADCVD proceedings and free trade.
Liquid sugar producers (known as sweetener stations or melt houses), on the other hand,
who were not part of the ADCVD petitioners, likely beneted from the Agreements.
2 Background
In the U.S., sugar is derived from both sugar beets and sugarcane. Rened sugar originating
from one source is physically and chemically identical to the other. An important charac-
teristic of sugar is the degree of rening purity, known as polarity, which is based on the
product's molasses content, color, and dextran content. A polarity measure of 100 degrees
signies pure, rened sugar. Lower measurements correspond to less rened sugar. The
USDA, Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the Customs and Border Patrol (CBP)
label any sugar of polarity less than 99.5 as raw sugar and any sugar of polarity of 99.5
degrees or greater as rened. Sugar of polarity equal to or greater than 99.5 is approved by
the FDA for human consumption, whereas sugar of less than 99.5 polarity is not.
Sugarcane is primarily grown in Florida, Louisiana, and Texas. Raw sugar is extracted
from sugarcane through a milling process. The raw sugar is then sent to reneries to be
transformed into rened sugar. Sugarbeets are planted annually and are grown in 11 states.
Most production occurs in the Great Plains and Far West. In contrast to sugarcane, sugar
beets do not go through the raw sugar stage. Instead, they are rened from beet to nal
product in a continuous process at a single manufacturing facility. The majority of beet
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processors in the U.S. are cooperative organizations owned by sugarbeet farmers.
In addition to standard cane reners and beet processing operations, there are also several
sweetener stations or melt houses in the U.S., which convert food-grade or near-food-grade
sugar into liquid (USITC, 2014). These liquid sugar processors are typically low-investment
operations that do not perform a signicant amount of rening and whose activities primarily
involve melting sugar and adding water. Liquid sugar is sold for industrial use and accounts
for approximately 17% of all sugar consumption in the U.S. (USITC, 2014).
The U.S. government employs several policy instruments, collectively known as the U.S.
sugar program, to restrict the amount of sugar supplied to the U.S. market in an eort to
support sugar prices (Jurenas, 2012). Growers receive annual marketing allotments (i.e.,
production quotas) and are eligible for short-term, non-recourse nancing through the Com-
modity Credit Corporation (CCC) (USDA, 2016). Forfeited sugar is sold for non-human
consumption or disposed of through re-export program credit swaps. Foreign access to the
U.S. market is heavily regulated. With the exception of Mexico, all imports are subject to
tari-rate quotas (TRQs) (Jurenas, 2012).2
Mexican sugar is derived entirely from sugarcane and is primarily marketed into the
U.S. in two forms: semi-rened (of polarity between 99.4 and 99.9 degrees, also known
as estandar) and rened sugar. Lower-polarity semi-rened sugar is sold to U.S. cane
reneries to be converted into rened sugar. Higher-polarity semi-rened sugar is typically
sold directly for human consumption or sent to melt houses to be transformed into liquid
sugar.
Beginning in late 2011, Mexican sugar exports to the U.S. nearly doubled from slightly
less than 1 million metric tonnes raw value (MTRV) to approximately 2 million MTRV and
remained high for the next three years. On March 28, 2014, the American Sugar Coalition
and its members led ADCVD petitions against sugar from Mexico.3 The USITC deemed
2For a discussion of TRQ administration, see Skully (2001).
3The precise scope of investigations included all products imported under US tari codes 1701.12.1000,
1701.12.5000, 1701.13.1000, 1701.13.5000, 1701.14.1000, 1701.14.5000, 1701.91.1000, 1701.91.3000,
1701.99.1025, 1701.99.5025, and 1701.99.5050.
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the domestic like product to include raw and rened cane and rened beet sugar, but
did not extend to high-fructose corn syrup. The USITC also deemed that one liquid sugar
producer had sucient capital investments to be considered part of the domestic industry;
all other melt houses were excluded. A timeline of the sugar litigation and suspension process
is presented in Table 1.
Table 1: U.S.-Mexico Sugar Suspension & Litigation Timeline
Date Event
Mar-14 American Sugar Coalition le ADCVD petitions against sugar from Mexico.
May-14 USITC makes preliminary determination that subject imports results in economic injury.
Aug-14 DOC determines subject imports received subsidies and announce preliminary duties.
Dec-14 ADCVD duty investigations suspended as a result of Agreements between the Mexican &
U.S. governments.
Jan-15 Imperial Sugar Company & AmCane Sugar, both sugar cane
reners who also process raw sugar imported from Mexico, contest the Suspension
Agreements & request continuation of the Investigation.
Mar-15 USITC nds that Suspension Agreements completely remove injurious eects of subject
imports (unanimous vote).
Apr-15 DOC rule that Imperial & AmCane has standing to request continuation of ADCVD
investigation.
Sep-15 DOC issues nal armative determination.
Nov-15 USITC issues nal armative determination. Agreements remain in force.
Dec-16 The American Sugar Coalition requests administrative review of the CVD Agreement.
Feb-17 USITC begins administrative review of Agreements.
Jun-17 U.S. & Mexican governments reach deal to revise Suspension Agreements.
On May 9, 2014, the USITC made a preliminary determination that the subject imports
resulted in economic injury to the U.S. sugar industry. On August 26, 2014, the DOC further
determined that the subject imports received subsidies and announced preliminary duties
on sugar imports from Mexico ranging from 39.54% to 47.26% (USITC, 2014).
On December 19, 2014, ADCVD investigations were suspended as a result of two Agree-
ments between the Mexican and U.S. governments.4 The Suspension Agreements stipulated
minimum FOB reference prices of 26¢ per lb. for sugar of polarity above 99.5, and 22.25¢ per
lb. for all other sugar. The Agreements also limited the amount of Mexican sugar exported
4The terms of the Suspension Agreements are detailed in USITC (2015).
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to the U.S. in a given scal year. Further, a maximum of 53% of exports from Mexico to
the U.S., in any given scal year (October 1 through September 30), could be rened sugar
(99.5 polarity or higher), with the remainder being raw (below 99.5 polarity).
After the Suspension Agreements were reached, two cane sugar renersImperial Sugar
Company (owned by Louis Dreyfus) and AmCane Sugarappealed arguing that the Suspen-
sion Agreements did not eliminate the injurious eects of the subject imports and requested
continuation of the investigations. On March 19, 2015, the USITC found by unanimous
vote that the Suspension Agreements completely removed the injurious eects. Imperial and
AmCane argued that the agreement would restrict imports of raw sugar from Mexico and
thereby hurt U.S. reners of imported Mexican sugar (see Table 1). The USITC ruled that
the terms eliminates completely the injurious eects of subject imports did not mean every
member of the domestic industry must be made better o from the Agreements, rather that
the Agreements beneted the domestic industry as a whole (USITC, 2015).
Nevertheless, Imperial and AmCane requested the investigations continue. In September
and November 2015, the DOC and USITC issued nal armative determinations that the
Agreements remained in eect. The DOC monitors and enforces the Suspension Agreements,
which are subject to administrative review and termination procedures.
In December 2016, the American Sugar Coalition alongside Imperial and AmCane re-
quested administrative review of the CVD Agreement. The USITC review process began
in February 2017 with the threat thatif the Suspension Agreements were not successfully
renegotiatedthe DOC would begin administering duties as of June 2017. The U.S. and
Mexican governments agreed to revised terms of the Agreements on June 5, 2017. Under
the revised Agreements, volumetric and price restrictions remain the same, but the share of
imports allowed over 99.5 polarity has been reduced from 53% to 30% (ITA, June 30, 2017).
U.S. cane reners remain opposed to the revised terms of the Agreements (Malkin, 6 June
2017).
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3 Empirical Analysis
We develop an empirical model to compare the returns to U.S. cane and beet farmers and cane
sugar reners under ADCVD investigations and the Suspension Agreements. We analyze the
impacts of each regime on U.S. raw and rened prices, the raw-to-rened margin, and the
quantity and composition of sugar imports from Mexico. Using these results, we compare
outcomes under ADCVD proceedings and the Agreements to a counter-factual free trade
scenario in which sugar from Mexico continues to enter the U.S. duty-and-quota-free.
3.1 U.S. Raw and Rened Sugar Prices
To analyze the impact of the investigations and the Agreements on U.S. raw and rened sugar
prices, we compare the historical relationship between domestic and world sugar prices under
three empirical regimes: (1) free trade (observed prior to initiation of ADCVD proceedings),
(2) ADCVD investigations (observed from April 2014Dec 2014), and (3) Suspension (ob-
served from Jan 2015Dec 2016). Our data includes monthly observations of U.S. and world
prices for raw and rened sugar from January 2011 to December 2016. The U.S. domestic
raw sugar price is the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) Sugar No. 16 nearby futures con-
tract.5 The world raw price is the nearby price for the ICE No. 11 contract.6 The world
rened price is the nearby price for the No. 5 London Daily futures contract for rened
sugar free-on-board in Europe. There is no futures market for rened sugar in the U.S.,
thus, we use the average monthly spot price for rened cane sugar as published by Milling
5Nearby refers to the contract with the closest settlement date. The ICE No. 16 contract species
that 112,000 pounds of raw cane sugar be physically delivered to one of ve U.S. renery ports: New
York, Baltimore, Galveston, New Orleans, or Savannah. Delivery months are January, March, May, July,
September, and November.
6The No. 11 contract species delivery of 112,000 pounds of raw cane sugar in delivery months March,
May, July, and October. Delivery on the No. 11 contract occurs at a port in the country of origin free-
on-board the receiver's vessel. Delivery can originate in about 30 dierent countries, including Australia,
Brazil, Costa Rica, South Africa, etc.
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Table 2: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Tests for Stationarity
Price Series Test-Statistic P-Value Conclusion
World Raw -2.100 0.24 Fail to Reject
World Rened -1.947 0.31 Fail to Reject
U.S. Raw -1.665 0.45 Fail to Reject
U.S. Rened (Cane) -1.768 0.40 Fail to Reject
& Baking Magazine.7 These price series are shown in Figure 1 alongside prices for rened
and semi-rened (estandar) sugar in Mexico for reference.8 The start date is purposely cho-
sen to correspond with the surge in Mexican sugar imports that gave rise to the ADCVD
proceedings.
As a preliminary matter, we briey consider the time-series properties of our data. If
U.S. and world prices are trending independently from one another, we run the risk of
identifying spurious, rather than genuine, correlation between prices. Table 2 reports the
results of Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests for stationarity for each series (Said and
Dickey, 1984). The second column reports the ADF test statistic, and the third column
reports the corresponding MacKinnon approximate p-value. As shown in Table 2, we fail
to reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity for all prices series. We address potential
concerns about spurious correlation in the discussion of estimation results below.
As another preliminary matter, it is also useful to ask whether there is evidence that the
ADCVD case and Agreements had an impact on domestic prices. To answer this question,
we use common procedures to test for the presence of a structural break in historical U.S.-
world price relationships in April 2014 (ADCVD) and December 2014 (Agreements). We
estimate the following equation over the period of analysis:
pt = α + βwt + εt (1)
7In recent months the U.S. price for rened beet sugar has diverged somewhat from the price for rened
cane sugar due, at least in part, to recent state and federal regulations concerning the labeling of genetically
modied organisms in food products. Because this price divergence is unrelated to the implementation of
the sugar Suspension Agreements, we elect to use the U.S. rened cane price.
8The price series for semi-rened and rened sugar in Mexico were obtained from Servicio Nacional de
Informacion de Mercados SNIIM-Economica.
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(b) Rened Prices
Source: The U.S. raw price series is the monthly nearby ICE No. 16 price obtained from Table 4 of the
USDA ERS Sugar and Sweeteners Yearbook. World raw and rened price series are obtained from Tables
03a and 03b from the USDA ERS Sugar and Sweeteners Yearbook. The world raw price series is the
monthly nearby ICE No. 11 price. The rened price is the average nearby price for Contract No. 407 (aka
no.5), London Daily Price, f.o.b. Europe. The price series for semi-rened (estandar) and rened sugar in
Mexico are obtained from Servicio Nacional de Informacion de Mercados SNIIM-Economica. The U.S.
rened sugar price is the simple monthly average of the lower end of the range for rened cane sugar as
published by Milling & Baking Magazine.
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where pt is the dependent price (U.S. raw or rened) observed at time t and wt is the
corresponding world price. Table 3 reports the results of tests for a known and an unknown
structural break in the historical U.S.-world raw price relationship and the U.S.-world rened
price relationship (Andrews, 1993; Chow, 1960). Column (1) and (2) show the results for a
known break at April 2014. Columns (3) and (4) show results for a known break at December
2014. In both specications, we strongly reject the null hypothesis of no structural break for
both the raw and rened series.
Table 3: Structural Break Analysis
Known Break Unknown Break
Apr-14 Dec-14
χ2 p-value χ2 p-value Break χ2 p-value
U.S. & World Raw Prices 187.55 0.00 79.85 0.00 Apr-14 187.55 0.00
U.S. & World Ref. Prices 231.02 0.00 319.45 0.00 Dec-14 269.46 0.00
Unknown break tests using the Supremum Wald statistic are shown in Columns (5)
through (7) of Table 3. Findings also strongly support the presence of a structural break.
The unknown break test for the raw price series identies the break at April 2014, consistent
with literature that nds ADCVD lings impact the market (Mahdavi and Bhagwati, 1994;
Prusa, 2001; Staiger and Wolak, 1994). The rened price series identies the break at
December 2014. Figure 2 presents the Wald statistic for each candidate break date. As
shown in the Figure, break results are fairly stark for both the raw (at April 2014) and
rened series (at December 2014), indicating the ndings from the break tests are robust.
We formally estimate the eects of ADCVD proceedings and the Agreements on the U.S.-
world raw price relationship and the U.S.-world rened price relationship using a regime-
switching model. For each U.S. price series we estimate the following equation:





SStwt−1 + εt (2)
where p (the U.S. price) and w (the world price) are dened as in equation (3) above. Vari-
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ables ft, It, and St are indicator variables for the pre-ADCVD free trade regime, the ADCVD
investigation regime, and the Agreement regime, respectively. Each of these indicator vari-
ables is equal to unity if at time t the corresponding regulatory regime is in eect and equal
to zero otherwise.9 The constant α is a parameter that measures the average wedge between
the dependent price variable in the U.S. and the corresponding world price over the time
horizon. The inclusion of the additional parameters δI and δS allow this domestic-to-world
price wedge to vary in the ADCVD and Agreement regimes. Coecients βf and βI and βS
measure the responsiveness of domestic prices to shocks to the world market under the three
regimes. The nal variable, ε, is a residual, which we have assumed is uncorrelated with the
other explanatory variables at time t. Table 4 shows the estimation results.
As shown in Table 4, based on monthly data, the imposition of the Agreements coincides
with a large and statistically signicant increase in the U.S.-world margin for both raw and
rened prices. Coecient δ̂S is 0.55 in the raw equation and 0.62 in the rened equation.
These estimates suggest that the Suspension Agreements increased the average domestic-
9Regime dates are as follows: Jan 2011Mar 2014 for the pre-ADCVD free trade regime, April 2014Dec
2014 for the ADCVD investigation regime, and Jan 2015Dec 2016 for the Agreement regime.
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Free Trade*Ln World Raw Price (L1) 0.875***
(0.077)
ADCVD*Ln World Raw Price (L1) 0.829***
(0.093)
Agreement*Ln World Raw Price (L1) 0.766***
(0.102)
Free Trade*Ln World Ref. Price (L1) 1.085***
(0.128)
ADCVD *Ln World Ref. Price (L1) 1.057***
(0.142)






(L1) indicates there is a one-period lag on the explanatory variable.
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
to-world price wedge by over 55% for raw sugar and 62% for rened sugar. Both estimates
are statistically signicant at conventional levels. Point estimates also suggest ADCVD
investigations increased the U.S.-world margin, though by a smaller magnitude than the
Agreements. Coecient δ̂I is 0.25 in the raw equation and 0.23 in the rened equation; both
estimates are statistically insignicant.
More restrictive regulatory regimes also appear to have reduced the responsiveness of
U.S. prices to shocks to the world market. In the raw equation, the world price coecient
is 0.88 in the pre-ADCVD free trade regime. The estimated coecient falls to 0.83 in the
13
U.S.-Mexico Sugar July 20, 2018
ADCVD regime and to 0.77 in the Agreement regime. Similarly, in the rened equation,
the coecient falls from 1.09 in the pre-ADCVD free trade regime, falling to 1.06 and to
0.93 in the ADCVD and Agreement regimes. Across both equations and for all regimes, the
lagged world price coecient is statistically signicant at the 1% level.
Table 5: Post-Estimation Wald Tests
Regime Comparison
Free Trade; ADCVD Free Trade; Agreement ADCVD; Agreement
Specication F-Statistic p-value F-Statistic p-value F-Statistic p-value
(1) U.S. Raw 5.2 0.0080 16.73 0.0000 6.97 0.0018
(2) U.S. Rened 3.59 0.0332 3.67 0.0309 1.44 0.2433
F statistic with 2 numerator and 66 denominator degrees of freedom.
Table 5 formally tests the hypothesis that the U.S.-world price relationship changed
following the initiation of ADCVD proceedings and the imposition of the Suspension Agree-
ments. Column (1) of the Table reports the F-statistic for a Wald test of the joint restrictions
δ̂I = 0 and β̂I = β̂f . Stated alternatively, these restrictions imply commencement of ADCVD
investigations had no eect on the U.S.-world price relationship. We reject this hypothesis
for both the U.S. raw and U.S. rened specications. Similarly, Column (3) tests the hy-
pothesis that price relationships under the Agreements were the same as those under the free
trade regime (joint restriction δ̂S = 0; β̂S = β̂f ). Again, we reject the hypothesis for both
specications. Finally, Column (5) tests the hypothesis that the U.S.-world price relation-
ship is unchanged from the ADCVD investigation regime to the Agreement regime (δ̂I = δ̂S;
β̂I = β̂S). We reject this hypothesis at the 1% level for the U.S. raw specication but fail to
reject for the U.S. rened price.
We contrast predicted U.S. raw and rened sugar prices generated by estimating equation
(2) with a counterfactual price series in which the ADCVD investigation was never led and
the Agreements were never implemented. These counterfactual prices (p̃t) are constructed
14
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from the pre-ADCVD free trade coecients estimated in equation (2) as follows:
p̃ft =α̂ + β
fwt−1
p̃It =α̂ + δ̂
I + βIwt−1
Figure 3 shows the U.S. raw prices predicted under each regime over the estimation hori-
zon. Actual and counterfactual price estimates generated using the pre-ADCVD free trade
regime coecients are depicted as the solid black line of Figure 3. The dashed green line
depicts prices generated using the ADCVD regime estimates, and the solid red line depicts
prices for the Agreement regime.



















ADCVD File Date Agreement Date
Pre-ADCVD Regime
ADCVD Regime Agreement Regime
Table 6 compares predicted ADCVD and Agreement price series with counterfactual
free trade prices. From April to December 2014, ADCVD proceedings increased U.S. raw
sugar prices by 2.83¢ per lb. (from 21.93¢ to 24.76¢) relative to what they would have
been had investigations not been led, i.e., under the counterfactual free trade regime.
In contrast, the Suspension Agreement increased U.S. raw sugar prices by an average of
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5.80¢ per lb. (from 20.58¢ to 26.37¢). Turning to U.S. rened prices in Table 6, ADCVD
proceedings increased prices by 4.65¢ per lb. (from 30.32¢ to 34.97¢) relative to free trade
regime counterfactual estimates. Agreement regime prices increased by 4.50¢ (from 29.11¢
to 33.61¢).
Table 6: Impact of ADCVD Filing & Suspension Agreements on U.S. Sugar Prices
ADCVD Regime Agreement Regime
Predicted Free Trade CF ∆ Predicted Free Trade CF ∆
Price Series (¢ per lb.)
U.S. Raw 24.76 21.93 2.83 26.37 20.58 5.79
(1.22) (1.14) (0.08) (4.44) (3.97) (0.47)
U.S. Rened 34.97 30.32 4.65 33.61 29.11 4.50
(1.99) (1.78) (0.22) (5.68) (5.82) (0.15)
Standard Deviation in parentheses.
To assess whether U.S. cane and beet farmers prefer the ADCVD regime or the Suspension
Agreements, we deduce an equivalent ad valorem tari scenario. Domestic prices (pt) are
equal to the world price plus an ad valorem tari, i.e., pt = (1 + τ)wt, where the tari (τ)
is calculated in order to generate an impact on U.S. prices that is equivalent, on average, to
the ADCVD investigations and Suspension Agreements.10
Table 7: Equivalent ad valorem Tari
Regime
Price Series ADCVD Agreement
U.S. Raw 52% 69%
U.S. Rened 43% 70%
As shown in Table 6, the equivalent taris for the ADCVD regime were 52% for raw
sugar and 43% for rened sugar. These numbers are in the range of the preliminary duties
assessed by the DOC. In contrast, the equivalent taris for raw and rened sugar under
the Agreements were 69% and 70%, considerably higher than those imposed by the DOC.
Our calculation of the ad valorem tari equivalent to the Suspension Agreements is striking
10Note that this approach to deriving the equivalent tari is more straightforward than some methods which
rely on more complex simulation. Because U.S. production and all non-Mexico imports are constrained, we
do not need to worry about simultaneity between prices and aggregate deliveries.
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because it implies not only that U.S. cane and beet farmers prefer the terms of the Suspen-
sion Agreements to duties, but also that the returns to the dierent producer groups, as a
percentage of initial revenue, were similar.11
3.2 Cane Rener Revenue
To assess the impact of the Suspension Agreements on U.S. sugar rener revenue, we analyze
both the change in the raw-to-rened price margin and the availability of raw sugar under
the Agreements. The estimates from equation (2) imply a 1.82¢ per lb. increase (from 8.40¢
to 10.21¢) in the raw-to-rened margin under the ADCVD regime relative to the free trade
counterfactual. In contrast, under the Agreement regime, the implied margin fell 1.29¢ per
lb. (from 8.53¢ to 7.24¢). Thus, the impacts of ADCVD investigations and the Agreements
on rener revenue hinges critically on the quantity and composition of sugar imports from
Mexico.
Table 8 reports average monthly Mexican sugar imports into the U.S. under the three
regimes. Note that we have chosen to exclude the months JanuaryFebruary from these
averages to control for seasonality; the ADCVD regime runs only from AprilDecember 2014,
whereas in our dataset the other two regimes run January to December. We present data
under both U.S. and Mexican tari classications. The top number in each row corresponds
to the average monthly imports in 1,000 MTRV for the relevant tari category. The value in
parenthesis is the share of total imports over the relevant timeframe. For the ADCVD and
Agreement regimes, statistical signicance of the change assessed relative to the free trade
regime via a conventional mean comparison t-test, indicated by stars.
At the aggregate level, statistics are similar under the U.S. and Mexican classications.
First looking at total trade volume, average monthly imports totaled 132,000 MTRV prior
11We note that a long-standing issue in the trade literature is whether there is a functional dierence
between, say a 40% and 70% tari. They could both be prohibitive. In the current setting, this is not the
case. As discussed in the next section, Mexican sugar producers have continued to import into the U.S. under
both the ADCVD investigations and the Suspension Agreements. Because U.S. sugar prices are signicantly
higher than world prices, the U.S. remains an attractive export market even with a large tari.
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Table 8: Impact of ADCVD Filing & Agreements on Quantity & Composition of Imports
Average Monthly Imports
Free Trade ADCVD Agreement
20112013 2014 20152016
1,000 MTRV
US Tari Classication (Share of total imports)
Total Imports 132.35 102.46 110.06
(1.00) (1.00) (1.00)
Polarity <99.5 35.69 27.1 56.04*
(0.21) (0.15) (0.49)***
Polarity >99.5 96.67 75.36 54.06***
(0.79) (0.85) (0.51)***
Mexican Tari Classication
Total Imports 128.84 98.76 105.6
(1.00) (1.00) (1.00)
Polarity 9699.4 16.30 17.06 13.72
(0.09) (0.08) (0.10)
Polarity 99.499.5 17.40 19.53 42.94***
(0.09) (0.15) (0.43)***
Polarity 99.599.7 16.25 15.71 3.38***
(0.12) (0.16) (0.04)***
Polarity 99.799.9 5.73 3.96 2.34
(0.04) (0.06) (0.02)
Polarity >99 72.91 42.49** 42.92***
(0.66) (0.44)*** (0.41)***
Observations 27 9 18
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
For each regime, quantity and composition of average monthly imports are
evaluated for months AprilDecember to control for seasonality of trade ows.
U.S. import data obtained from the USITC Interactive Tari and Trade
DataWeb.
Mexican export data obtained from la Sistema de Informacíon Arancelaria Vía
Internet.
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to the initiation of ADCVD proceedings. Under ADCVD investigations average imports
dropped to 102,000 MRTV and rose slightly to 110,000 MRTV under the Agreements. Sim-
ilarly, under the Mexican tari classication, average exports to the U.S. totaled 132,000
MTRV under free trade, 98,000 MTRV under ADCVD investigations, and 105,000 MTRV
under the Agreements. The two data sources also produce a similar breakdown between
sugar above and below 99.5 polarity before and after the Agreement.
Referring to the U.S. tari classication data, we see that the Suspension Agreements
appear to be operating as intended. Total import volume decreased by over 22,000 MTRV
per month on average, or 17%, from free trade levels.12 Additionally, the composition of
imports appears to have dramatically shifted. When Mexican sugar entered the U.S. duty-
and-quota-free, approximately 75% of all imports were of polarity above 99.5. The volume
of imports above 99.5 polarity fell by 44% after the imposition of the Agreements. In
contrast, the volume of imports below 99.5 polarity increased by 57%. Thus, under the
Agreements, import shares are approximately equal for sugar above and below 99.5 polarity.
The substantial increase in sugar below 99.5 polarity suggests an increase in the availability
of sugar imports for further rening, and thus, that sugar reners may have beneted under
the Agreement. This interpretation is based on U.S. tari classications, which are used to
ensure compliance with the Agreements.
However, the more disaggregated Mexican tari classication data tell a very dierent
story. These data are also depicted on a monthly basis in Figure 4. As shown from Table
8 and Figure 4, the increase in sugar imports below 99.5 polarity came exclusively from an
expansion in imports between 99.4 and 99.5 polaritysemi-rened sugar (estandar) that is
sold to sweetener stations or melt houses instead of sugar reners (Sterk, 2016). Referring
to Table 8, average monthly imports of sugar between 99.4 and 99.5 polarity increased by
147% from the free trade regime to the Suspension environment.
12Note that changes in the size of the U.S. crop or U.S. demand could impact import volumes. However,
as long as these uctuations are random over time, they contribute only to the noise of our estimates and
do not bias the results.
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ADCVD File Date Agreement Date
(b) Composition of Total Sugar Exports
Mexican HTS Categories are as follows:
 17011401: Sugar (dry) of polarity between 99.4 and 99.5 degrees.
 17011402: Sugar (dry) of polarity between 96 and 99.4 degrees.
 17011403: Sugar (dry) of polarity less than 96 degrees.
 17019901: Sugar (dry) of polarity between 99.5 and 99.7 degrees.
 17019902: Sugar (dry) of polarity between 99.7 and 99.9 degrees.
 17019999: Sugar (dry) not elsewhere specied.
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In contrast to semi-rened imports, sugar imported for further rening under Mexican
classications decreased under the Agreements. Table 8 shows that average monthly imports
of sugar between 96 and 99.4 polarity fell from 16,300 MTRV in free trade to 13,720 MTRV
under the Agreements. Thus, the Agreements reduced both the raw-to-rened price margin
and left U.S. reners with less access to inputs under the Suspension Agreements.
This dramatic shift in the composition of imports did not occur during ADCVD inves-
tigations. The initiation of ADCVD proceedings had a greater eect than the Agreements
on total sugar imports. Under ADCVD investigations, total sugar imports from Mexico fell
by 30,000 MTRV according to both U.S. and Mexican tari classication. However, the
composition of imports remained relatively unchanged. In fact, sugar imported for further
rening (polarity 9699.4) increased by approximately 1,000 MTRV per month.
Table 9 reports estimates of the net impact of the ADCVD investigations and the Agree-
ments on monthly rener revenue. As discussed, the Agreements reduced the raw-to-rened
price margin relative to the pre-ADCVD free trade counterfactual from 8.53¢ per lb. to
7.24¢ per lb. Reners receive this lower margin not only for sugar imports, but also for do-
mestic raw sugar and sugar imports from countries other than Mexico. In FY 2015/16, the
U.S. produced an average of 292,570 MTRV of raw sugar and imported 98,460 MTRV of raw
sugar from other countries. Because U.S. production is restricted under USDA marketing
allotments and all imports of non-Mexican origin are restricted under tari rate quotas and
free trade agreements, these quantities would have been the same under the counterfactual
scenario.
After accounting for the raw sugar available for rening from all other sources (i.e., do-
mestic cane production and non-Mexican raw imports), average monthly rener revenue
under the Agreements falls by an estimated $12 million per month compared to the unregu-
lated counterfactual scenario. In other words, the Suspension Agreements have not beneted
U.S. cane reners. Rather, over their rst two years of existence, the Suspension Agreements
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Table 9: Average Monthly Cane Rener Revenue, Jan 2015Dec 2016
ADCVD Regime Agreement Regime
Predicted Free Trade CF Predicted Free Trade CF
(1,000 MTRV)
U.S. Raw Production 292.57 292.57 292.57 292.57
MX Imports for further rening 17.06 16.30 13.72 16.30
Raw TRQ Imports 98.46 98.46 98.46 98.46
Total Sugar to be rened 408.09 407.33 404.75 407.33
Raw-to-Ref. Margin (¢ per lb.) 10.21 8.40 7.24 8.53
Total Rener Rev. (Million) $91.86 $75.43 $64.60 $76.60
Dierence (Million) $ 16.43 -$12.00
have cost U.S. reners approximately 16% in lost revenue.13
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 9 compare this outcome with rener revenue under the
ADCVD regime, in which total trade decreases by 23% but the composition of trade remains
relatively unaected by the policy. We also account for the fact that the raw-to-rened price
margin increased by 1.81¢ per lb. as a result of investigations. In this scenario, average
monthly rener revenue increased by $16.43 million per month$28.43 million greater than
under the Suspension Agreements.
4 Model Robustness
We employ a moving block bootstrap procedure to measure the robustness of our ndings
(Kunsch, 1989). This method allows us to vary the starting and ending dates of our estima-
tion period at random to assess model sensitivity and robustness across the time horizon.
Observations from the Agreement regime are split into 19 overlapping blocks each six months
in length. Blocks are drawn randomly with replacement and the following model is estimated
for raw and rened price series:
pt = α + βwt−1 + εt (3)
13Note that these ndings do not suggest that all U.S. reners have been hurt by the Agreements. Some
reners, such as those not dependent on raw sugar from Mexico, could have beneted. Our nding is a net
eect across reners as a whole.
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where variables are dened as above in equation (2). We repeat the procedure 1,000 times
to generate a distribution for α̂ and β̂. Note that we do not employ the block bootstrap for
the ADCVD regime; the short sample length of the regime (9 months) would create only 3
unique draws for the bootstrap procedure.
Table 10: Block Bootstrap Predicted Agreement Regime Prices
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Err. 95% Conf. Int.
U.S. Raw 1,000 26.17 0.03 26.10 26.24
U.S. Rened 1,000 33.88 0.06 33.75 34.00
U.S. Margin 1,000 7.71 0.09 7.52 7.89
Table 10 shows the distributions generated by the block bootstrap procedure for U.S. raw
and rened sugar prices. Mean estimates for each series are similar to those generated for the
full sample (Table 6). The small standard errors for each series (Table 10) also suggest that
the U.S.-world relationship is relatively stable across the regime time horizon. Accordingly,
condence intervals are also small for our equivalent tari. The estimates in Table 10 imply
a 95% condence interval for equivalent taris (derived as described in Section 3.1) between
67%68% for the U.S. raw price and 71%72% for the U.S. rened price.
Table 10 also shows the implied distribution for the U.S. raw-to-rened margin generated
by our block bootstrap procedure. Interestingly, the full-sample point estimate (7.24¢ per
lb.) falls outside the 95% condence interval for the block bootstrap results (7.527.89¢ per
lb.). Thus, our bootstrap estimates suggest the impact of the Agreements on rener revenue
was smaller than our initial model suggests. Bootstrap results also suggest the impact was
statistically dierent from zero. The 95% condence interval for the rener revenue impact
is between -$6.20 and -$9.50 million, compared to the full sample estimate of -$12.00 million
(Table 9).
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5 Conclusion
Supplier access to the U.S. sugar market is heavily regulated. The USDA prescribes market-
ing allotments on domestic sugar reners, and, with the exception of Mexico, all imported
sugar is subject to WTO tari-rate quotas or other restrictions under regional trade agree-
ments. Following a surge in Mexico sugar exports to the U.S. in FY2011/12, the American
Sugar Coalition initiated AD and CVD investigations against sugar from Mexico. On De-
cember 19, 2014, these investigations were suspended as a result of two Agreements that
imposed volumetric and minimum price restrictions on Mexican sugar entering the U.S.
We compare the eects of the ADCVD case with the Suspension Agreements on the
welfare of U.S. beet and cane farmers and cane sugar reners. Because domestic production
is restricted by quota, protability for domestic cane and beet producers is primarily deter-
mined by raw and rened prices. In contrast, revenue for cane reners is a function of both
the raw-to-rened margin and the availability of sugar for further rening, including from
imports. Under the Agreements, the imperfect correspondence between U.S. tari classi-
cations and the types of sugar produced in Mexico created the potential for cross-product
trade diversion among rened, semi-rened, and raw sugar. The Agreements result in an
increase in the share of imports of semi-rened sugar from Mexico (i.e., estandar) and a drop
in the share of raw and rened sugar imports from Mexico.
We develop an empirical model to compare U.S. raw and rened prices under ADCVD
taris and the Suspension Agreements with a counter-factual scenario under which sugar
from Mexico enters the U.S. duty-and-quota-free. Our model implies price impacts under
ADCVD investigations approximately equivalent to the duties assessed under the DOC's
preliminary ndings. In contrast, the increase in U.S. prices for raw and rened sugar under
the Suspension Agreements was roughly equal to those induced by a 70% ad valorem taris
on sugar imports from Mexico, substantially higher than those assessed under the DOC's
preliminary ndings. Thus, domestic sugarcane and beet farmers were made better o by
the Suspension Agreements than they would have been by ADCVD duties.
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However, the Agreements have resulted in a major shortfall in U.S. imports of sugar
for further rening. Imports destined for liquid sugar producers (i.e., melt houses) have
increased, while sugars of lower polarity used as a rening input have decreased by 16%.
The net eect is a revenue loss of $12 million per month for cane reners in aggregate
relative to a scenario in which sugar from Mexico is unrestricted. In contrast, our estimates
suggest rener revenue increased by $16 million under ADCVD proceedings. Therefore, some
domestic reners have been made worse o by the Suspension Agreements. Melt houses, who
were not part of the ADCVD petitioners likely beneted from the Agreements.
The 2014 Suspension Agreements were renegotiated in June 2017, but some U.S. cane
reners remain unsatised (Malkin, 6 June 2017). Our ndings shed light on the poten-
tial disconnect between the apparent benets of Suspension Agreements to trade remedy
participants in theory and the scant use of such instruments in practice. As a preliminary
matter for ADCVD investigations, the USITC denes the scope of domestic products that
are considered like the subject imports, including the array of products which are suf-
ciently substitutable with imports and the various stages of production that fall within
the domestic product. The inclusion of multiple upstream and downstream rms within a
domestic industry creates divergent intra-industry bargaining incentives and complicates sus-
pension negotiations. Under these circumstances, trade suspension may generate undesirable
or unstable equilibria.
These issues remain central to NAFTA re-negotiations. Chapter 19 of NAFTA provides
a mechanism whereby private petitioners from the U.S., Canada, and Mexico may request
an independent bi-national panel to review nal ADCVD determinations in other NAFTA
member countries (CBP, May 14, 2014). This panel process substitutes for domestic judicial
review and decisions cannot be appealed to domestic courts. The Trump Administration
has expressed a desire to eliminate Chapter 19 while Canada and Mexico want to retain the
provision to ensure the neutrality of ADCVD proceedings (Lester, September 4, 2017).
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